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In December 2008, I had breakfast with an elderly Bidayuh man and his daughter in their 
upland village—one of four due to be resettled to make way for a new dam and reservoir. 
With an official land compensation ceremony
i
 a few days away, the conversation meandered, 
as it often did, towards the project. My elderly interlocutor—a follower of the old rituals, 
adat gawai—had been reminiscing about life in the 1950s, ‘before [Sarawak became part of] 
Malaysia’.ii Back then, he said, the bus fare to Kuching was under a dollar; food in the city 
came in generous portions for just ten cents, and trousers cost a few dollars. These days, 
however, everything was expensive because those Malays who ruled the country didn’t know 
how to run the ‘economy’ (English). But being Malay was difficult, added his Anglican 
daughter, since they were Muslim and had to live according to strict observances. Ruminating 
further, they began to contrast the lives of Muslims with those of Christians, who today form 
the bulk of the Bidayuh population.  
Running through the different churches in the area, they concurred that the ‘strongest’ of the 
lot was the Sidang Injil Borneo (SIB), or Borneo Evangelical Church—a non-denominational 
organization with a small but vocal local presence. Those people were rich, they declared, 
and their prayers really worked; indeed, the SIB leaders were so powerful that they were 
often able to tell the future. To illustrate their point, they mentioned ‘Pastor Henman’ 
(pseudonym): a white preacher who visited the region regularly, and who had predicted 
2004’s Boxing Day tsunami. More recently, he had prophesied bad things for the dam being 
constructed downstream: perhaps it would collapse or just fail. But of course, this was hardly 
surprising, explained the old man, since the soil at the construction site was poor, prone to 
landslides and flooding. As I discovered later, it was also an area filled with capricious local 
place spirits which might respond badly to the upheavals around them. All things considered, 
my interlocutors concluded that the dam would almost certainly run into problems.  
As ethnographic episodes went, this was an admittedly difficult one to follow. Rather than 
forming a coherent narrative, our discussion drew together several topics—the economy, 
development, ethnicity and religion—in a seemingly formless pastiche of associations. Here, 
Islam, Christianity and the old spirit beliefs segued in and out of view; one analytical blink 
and a breakfast companion would have missed them. Yet their import in my acquaintances’ 
lives cannot be overstated. In this chapter, I argue that despite the nominal a-religiosity of 
official discourses and policies, religious considerations play a crucial role in shaping—and 
ambiguating—Bidayuhs’ engagements with development and the state. But rather than taking 
the explosive form of church-bombings or demonstrations (such as those seen during 2010’s 
‘Allah’ controversy),iii these engagements possess a far more muted, quotidian quality. By 
teasing out their manifestations in the context of a dam-construction and resettlement scheme, 
this chapter reveals how religious toleration and conflict in areas of significant ethnic 
plurality are not necessarily diametric states, but can exist as strands of a single tangled web. 
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We begin, however, by situating the case study in its larger context: the developmentalist 
milieu of contemporary Sarawak.  
 
The ‘anti-politics’ of Sarawakian developmentalism 
As elsewhere in Malaysia, Sarawak’s politics and economy over the last few decades have 
been driven by a particularly vigorous brand of ‘development’ (pembangunan). A variant of 
the top-down, technocratic model of development that emerged in the post-World War II 
international order (Escobar 2012), the pembangunan paradigm seeks to transform Malaysia 
into a prosperous economic power, and eventually, a fully-developed nation. Since 
independence, it has become Sarawak’s ‘ultimate civil postulate, closely tied to ideas of 
political legitimacy’ (Brosius 2000, p.1), suffusing relations between the state and its citizens.    
To a greater extent than in West Malaysia, Sarawakian developmentalism is dominated by an 
ideological dualism between ‘native rural society’ and ‘modern society’ (Bissonnette 2011, p. 
350). This dichotomy feeds a powerful temporalizing discourse that depicts rural 
communities as impoverished and backward, needing to be incorporated into the modern, 
progressive mainstream of Malaysian citizenry. Decrying shifting cultivation, hunter-
gathering and other ‘traditional’ subsistence practices as incommensurate with the nation’s 
forward trajectory, the Sarawakian government has channelled its energy into reshaping ‘the 
practices and conceptions of rural native populations … for the enhancement of economic 
production’ (ibid., p. 351). This transformation is formulated in overtly economic and 
technological terms, and visibly manifested through electricity generators, schools and clinics 
in remote areas, mega-dams and oil palm plantations. Like the ‘anti-politics machine’ 
famously described in Lesotho by James Ferguson (1990), Sarawak’s development apparatus 
appears to operate beyond ethnic, religious and party politics. The notion of pembangunan as 
a virtuous, top-down endeavour which it enshrines, moreover, permeates the thoughts and 
language of Sarawak’s urban elite, among them the Bidayuh politicians chiefly responsible 
for bringing development to their rural constituencies (e.g. Mamit et al. 2003; Minos 2000).  
It is within this ideological and political framework that the dam-construction and 
resettlement scheme discussed in this chapter has unfolded.
iv
 Located in the hills near the 
Indonesian border, several hours’ walk from the nearest road, the four villages involved in 
this scheme are prime targets for the state’s developmentalist aspirations. While by no means 
isolated from the ‘modern’ world, they have not been urbanized to the same extent as their 
roadside counterparts, some of which are now virtually suburbs of Kuching. Most villagers 
are subsistence rice farmers who earn a small income by cultivating cash crops such as rubber, 
cocoa and pepper, and providing irregular labour for nearby construction projects, including 
the dam. Many have spent some time studying or working in town, and all of them have 
friends and family in urban areas. Nevertheless, their relative isolation has made it easy for 
the state, the media and other Bidayuhs to portray them as ‘remote’ (ulu/jo), ‘poor’ (miskin) 
and ‘not yet’ (belum/bayuh) developed. When the resettlement scheme was first publicized, 
for example, the Borneo Post quoted a Bidayuh politician involved in it as saying, ‘If we 
leave them there, then they are denied access to many basic infrastructure and facilities. As a 
leader, I feel guilty if I am unable to help these people. You know, they are too deep in the 
interior and their population is small. To bring major development there is not economical’.  
Such remarks treat the improvement of the villagers’ lives as an ethical necessity—a means 
of making them fully Malaysian. Accordingly, the scheme has been depicted from the outset 
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in terms of progress (kemajuan), modernization and material welfare. Drawing an 
isomorphism between the well-being of the state and the communities, its political architects 
exhort the affected villagers to contribute to the greater good (averting water shortages in the 
capital) rather than selfishly oppose it. Their reward, so to speak, is the gift of development: a 
better, easier life in a planned township along the main road with free cement houses, piped 
water, 24-hour electricity and access to modern amenities. In this new location, shifting 
agriculture will be consigned to a benighted pre-modern past; with each household being 
assigned just three acres of land, the villagers will be steered towards new priorities and 
economic opportunities such as oil palm, cash cropping and eco-tourism.  
As this brief overview reveals, the insistent futurism of Sarawak’s dominant development 
discourse simultaneously obviates any reference to ethnicity or religion—two of the most 
divisive factors in Malaysian society today. Yet, as the rest of this chapter argues, the reality 
of development on the ground is more complex than is initially apparent. In the following 
pages, I shall examine the close entwinement of Islam, Christianity and the old rituals, adat 
gawai, in rural Bidayuhs’ experiences of development. My exploration centres on two 
interlocking themes: the politics of religion, and its moral and conceptual purchase in 
Bidayuhs’ lives. I suggest that for most Bidayuhs, development in Sarawak is inseparable 
from ethnic and religious politics—particularly the Malay-Muslim hegemony which they see 
as lying at the heart of Malaysian statehood. Rather than entering into open conflict with the 
government and Islam, however, many of them have found alternative means of dealing with 
the upheavals around them, particularly by recourse to the other two religious influences in 
their lives: adat gawai and Christianity. These responses reveal how pembangunan has 
become an arena in which religious tensions, but also strategies of accommodation, are 
played out in numerous small-scale, uneven ways. In this respect, the dam-construction and 
resettlement scheme may be seen as a microcosm of the situation in East Malaysia, where 
constant, daily negotiation rather than clear-cut conflict tends to characterise inter-religious 
relations.  
 
Framing the problem: pembangunan and Malay-Muslim hegemony 
The Bidayuh villagers affected by the dam are not unaware of the politically-charged 
discourses swirling around them; indeed, many are firm subscribers to the ideal of economic 
and material progress that underpins Sarawak’s pembangunan paradigm. Yet their eagerness 
to participate in this grand enterprise is tempered by an abiding sense of marginalization by 
the very state that is meant to be ‘giving’ them development. To account for this, we need to 
examine the peculiar relationship between development, ethnicity and religion in Sarawak.  
As elsewhere in Malaysia, Sarawak’s economic and development policies have long been 
tempered by a form of ‘economic indiginism [sic]’ (Siddique and Suryadinata 1981) that 
explicitly privileges the interests of ‘native’ populations. Initially a post-independence 
measure to enable Malays to compete with other races—notably the economically dominant 
Chinese (Watson 1996)—the bumiputera (lit. ‘sons of the soil’) system has generated a 
highly-fraught dichotomy between Malays and non-Malays on the Peninsula (see also Yeoh, 
this volume). However, the situation in Sarawak and Sabah, where there are large non-Malay 
bumiputera populations, is more complex. As one of Sarawak’s recognized ‘native’ groups, 
Bidayuhs are theoretically entitled to the same ‘bumi’ quotas, benefits and economic 
incentives as Malays. But in practice, many of my acquaintances feel short-changed by the 
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particular ethno-religious configuration of power that has dominated Sarawakian politics over 
the last few decades: one they associate with the government of Taib Mahmud, Sarawak’s 
Melanau Chief Minister since 1981.  
The Melanau are unusual among Sarawak’s native groups in having mostly converted to 
Islam over centuries of contact with the Bruneian sultanate and coastal traders. Historically, 
such converts were assimilated into the politically dominant Malay category. Although 
contemporary Melanau politicians have since disentangled their ethnic identity from their 
religion (Boulanger 2009, pp. 72-82; Postill 2008, p. 92), the Melanau-Malay association—
with Islam at its core—continues to run deep in both party politics and the eyes of most 
Sarawakians.
v
 In light of this, many Bidayuhs view Taib primarily as a Muslim whose 
influence stems from his collaboration with other Muslims—particularly the Malays in Kuala 
Lumpur who run the nation. Indeed, they routinely describe his government as ‘Kirieng’—the 
term for ‘Malay’ which automatically implies ‘Muslim’. When my acquaintances talk about 
the Raja Kirieng (the Malay rajas) who rule Sarawak, then, they are referring to a particular 
Malay/Melanau amalgam held together by their religious affiliation. Accordingly, their 
responses to pembangunan, which they also associate with Taib’s government, are frequently 
coloured by anxieties over Malay/Melanau-Muslim dominance.   
As I argue elsewhere (Chua 2007), Bidayuhs have long had an awkward relationship with 
Islam, which they portray as trapping its adherents in a strict religious and praxiological 
regime incompatible with their own modes of sociality. Since independence, these concerns 
have been amplified and given new shape by Malay political dominance of West Malaysia. 
More than being a problematic ‘other’, Kirieng are now seen as having acquired a position of 
immense power as rulers of the nation, thereby turning Islam into a powerful means of 
obtaining political and economic resources. In Bidayuhs’ eyes, this has generated a two-tiered 
bumiputera system, with Muslim bumiputera (Malays and Melanaus) monopolising all the 
benefits, and non-Muslim bumiputera becoming ‘second-class indigenes’ (Bala, this volume; 
Boulanger 2009, pp. 115-17; Postill 2008, p. 195). It is widely said, for example, that if ten 
civil service jobs are advertised for bumiputera, nine will go to Malays—even if the other 
candidates are better qualified. Yet it is not only ethnic Malays or Melanaus who enjoy access 
to these perks, for others can also buy into this world. Such was the consensus whenever my 
acquaintances and I drove past a nearby Bidayuh village that had converted en masse to Islam: 
Look at their tarred roads and brand new community hall, my interlocutors would point out; 
all you need to do is ‘enter Islam’ (mǔrǔt Islam) to get development from this government.  
Such low-level grumblings are endemic throughout Bidayuh communities, but have acquired 
new intensity in the context of the dam-construction project. Although the affected villagers 
have been split by the scheme, with some vehemently opposing resettlement, others 
enthusiastically supporting it and everyone else shuttling in between, all parties concur that 
the Kirieng government has a poor record of ‘giving’ development to non-Muslim 
bumiputera like themselves. I was frequently told during fieldwork, particularly while 
walking past the dam construction site or Land and Survey boundary markers, that the 
government only brought kemudahan (facilities) and maju (progress)
vi
 to its own people—
Malays, Melanaus, Muslims. For my companions, this was a sore point: if the Kirieng could 
bring them to Borneo Highlands—a luxury resort and golf course built atop a nearby 
mountain—why could they not do so here? While the religious factor was often so self-
evident as not to require exposition, it was nonetheless a resource on which people drew 
freely. Reflecting on different countries’ economic situations, for example, an elderly man 
told me that Malaysia was full of poor people. When I asked if there were many poor Malay 
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villages, however, he sniggered. ‘Look at what happens during their gawai [religious festivals, 
i.e. Hari Raya],’ he said, ‘the government gives them food, drink, everything. And when it 
comes to our own gawai [i.e. Christmas and the traditional harvest festival]? Nothing.’  
Such remarks reveal a pervasive suspiciousness over the intentions and priorities of the 
Sarawakian government, even when it claims to be giving development to the people. For 
Bidayuhs, what sets Kirieng apart from other bumiputera is less their ethnicity than their 
religion, which they see as woven into the fabric of political dominance in Malaysia. While 
wholly endorsing official ideals of progress and prosperity, my acquaintances have less faith 
in a model of pembangunan magically emptied of ethnicity and religion. In their eyes, 
development—and indeed their lives in contemporary Sarawak—cannot be disassociated 
from Malay/Melanau-Muslim hegemony. This awareness serves as a powerful filter through 
which to account for recent changes while also providing a language through which to 
articulate their grievances. Accordingly, what enthusiasm there is for resettlement is 
moderated by the nagging fear that the Kirieng government will renege on its promises, while 
objectors to the scheme cite delays and compensation-related problems as proof of the state’s 
disinterest in non-Muslim bumiputera. In these moments, religious politics becomes 
implicated in the success or failure of government-led development, acting as one of many 
strands in the nexus of relations between Bidayuhs and the state. 
For all their unhappiness over their perceived religious and political marginality however, 
Bidayuhs are aware that religion, particularly Islam, is a delicate topic in Malaysia that—as a 
teenage acquaintance explained with much hang-wringing—can get people into trouble with 
the ‘ISA’ (Internal Security Act). This impression is reinforced through periodic reports of 
religious conflict in the local media, such as the Lina Joy affair, in which a Malay convert to 
Christianity tried unsuccessfully to obtain official recognition of her new status, and more 
recent protests and church-bombings over the use of the word ‘Allah’ by Malaysian 
Christians (2010). Moreover, it is not uncommon for Bidayuhs—like other Sarawakians (see, 
for example, Bala, this volume)—to have friends and relations who have converted to Islam 
and ‘become Malay’ through marriage, migration or other reasons. In a region long 
characterized by such ethnic and religious fluidity, open religious conflict is thus not only 
politically risky, but also socially and pragmatically undesirable. In the face of all this, many 
Bidayuhs prefer not to rock the boat, but to find other less overt means of tapping Malaysia’s 
‘moden’ (modern) resources. Among these, as the next section reveals, are the political 
affordances of their old rituals, adat gawai, and the religion to which nearly all of them now 
adhere, Christianity.  
 
How to do things with religion 
The culturalization of adat gawai 
Until relatively recently, adat gawai was, like subsistence farming and remoteness, a badge 
of rural Bidayuhs’ backwardness in the eyes of the state. Officially classified alongside other 
indigenous ritual complexes as a ‘tribal/folk religion’ (agama suku kaum/folk), adat gawai 
occupies an implicitly inferior position to scripture-based world religions (agama) such as 
Christianity and Islam, which are associated with ‘modern’ citizenship. As one Bidayuh 
politician put it in 2000, ‘my estimate is that less than 25 percent of the Bidayuhs still cling to 
the old “adat” or religion. […] My prediction is that, as the Bidayuhs get more educated and 
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as the non-Christian ones meet and mix more with those already Christians [sic] in the 
villages or towns, one day almost 100 percent will be Christians’ (Minos 2000, p. 118).  
Over the last two decades, the old rituals have indeed continued to die out, leaving behind 
dwindling groups of elderly practitioners in a few villages, including one affected by the dam. 
Interestingly, however, their decline has been inversely mirrored by adat gawai’s redefinition 
and valorisation in official multiculturalist discourses as ‘Bidayuh culture’. Since the 1990s, 
the preservation, promotion and commercialization of ethnic ‘cultures’ has become 
increasingly central to Sarawak’s self-definition; an intrinsic part of its identity as a ‘modern’ 
state. These developments have turned ‘culture’—reified in the Bidayuh context as gawai-
based dances, costumes and paraphernalia—into an important and often lucrative mediator 
between indigenous groups and the state (see Chua 2012a). For the villagers affected by the 
dam, this culturalized form of gawai has also become an increasingly useful means of 
negotiating with the government.  
In many ways, their efforts have been stimulated by the state’s own policies. ‘Cultural 
preservation’ has been factored into the resettlement scheme since its commencement. Over 
the last few years, research teams from Sarawak’s Council for Customs and Traditions have 
visited the area to collect ‘traditional’ artefacts, information on gawai rituals, agricultural and 
environmental knowledge, myths and oral histories, among other things. Government funds 
have also been allocated for the construction of a new baruk (gawai ritual house) at the 
resettlement site, and for the performance of all the gawai rituals associated with the 
transition. Cumulatively, these measures have boosted the communities’ awareness of the 
political cachet of adat gawai as a potential bargaining chip with the government. The elderly 
man mentioned at the start of this chapter, for example, told me that he and other villagers 
consistently reminded the government officials they met that it was the state’s responsibility 
to provide a new baruk and other ritual facilities at the new site. If not, he told them 
forcefully, ‘Gawai will be lost. Our culture (budaya) will be lost.’ By transforming a 
developmental necessity into a moral burden, these practitioners effectively turned the state’s 
own conceptual frameworks to their advantage. 
In recent years, their case has been boosted by growing tourist interest in the four villages, 
particularly in the community furthest from the road, where gawai is still followed. Every 
month, small groups of backpackers, urbanites, and occasionally journalists and filmmakers, 
hike up to the area in search of nature and culture. Over the years, a cluster of villagers have 
become adept at catering to these visitors, running a number of private ‘homestay’ 
programmes and offering packages that include jungle hikes, ‘traditional’ cooking and—for a 
heftier sum—‘cultural’ dances performed by the elderly gawai practitioners. Such activities 
have brought an extra source of (non-governmental) income to the communities, but also 
opened the resettlement scheme to increased public scrutiny. Today, the looming prospect of 
moving is intrinsic to these villages’ ‘story’, winning them sympathisers and allies, 
widespread media coverage, and thus a modicum of leverage in their relations with the 
government. Over the years, newspaper clippings, photographs and VCDs of gawai dances 
and rituals have become part of residents’ engagements with the scheme: held up as proof not 
only of their ‘cultural’ distinctiveness, but also of their connections with influential outsiders, 
to whom they can (and do) report governmental missteps. 
In this way, the fate of the old rituals has become a point of negotiation between some of the 
affected villagers and government representatives: a publicly visible platform through which 
the former can take the state and its developmental agenda to task. Yet they do so not by 
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openly decrying Malay/Melanau-Muslim dominance, but by using one quintessentially 
Malaysian political vocabulary—that of ‘culture’—to critique another (‘development’). In the 
process, they have also been able to contest earlier pejorative portrayals of their old rituals 
while staking their claim to moden benefits in a way that circumvents Sarawak’s 
pembangunan apparatus.  
 
Modernity, munificence and Bidayuh Christianity 
Although Christianity—in the form of rudimentary mission schools and health facilities—
first entered Bidayuh areas in the late-nineteenth century, it was only from the late-1960s that 
large-scale conversion began to take place (see Chua 2012a, Chapter 3). Precipitated in part 
by post-independence demographic and socio-economic changes, this process was largely 
spearheaded by educated young Bidayuhs who saw it as a religion more suited to the 
demands of the new, urbanising world in which they now moved. During this period, 
Bidayuhs converted to Anglicanism and Catholicism in equal numbers with minimal regard 
for denominational specificities; as I explain elsewhere (Chua 2012a, p. 90), decisions on 
which church to ‘follow’ (tundak) were often based on kin relations, friendships, rivalries and 
other social considerations. Today, the vast majority of Bidayuhs belong to these two 
denominations, although a number of newer denominational and non-denominational 
churches, such as the Methodists, Seventh-Day Adventists and SIB, have garnered smaller 
congregations in the area. For the most part, however, Bidayuhs tend to refer to themselves as 
Christians first: a cue which I shall take in the discussion that follows.  
For many of my acquaintances, Christianity is a useful buffer against Muslim hegemony 
because of its officially recognized status as a ‘modern’ world religion (Chua 2007, 2012a). 
This enables them to assert their modernity and parity with Malays—a difficult task for 
followers of adat gawai—without having to convert to Islam. As we have seen, however, this 
claim to ‘modernity’ is no guarantee of development. Indeed, rural villagers occasionally 
speculate that the Kirieng government deliberately withholds amenities from them precisely 
because they are Christian. In the face of such perceived discrimination, Christianity has also 
come to acquire a different role: that of a benevolent provider which ‘gives’ Bidayuhs what 
the state doesn’t.  
Visits from charitable outsiders are nothing new to the affected communities. Over the years, 
they have received clothes, toys and medicines from the Sai Baba Council and other NGOs, 
funds for the upkeep of their bamboo bridges from ‘Chinese who go jogging in the jungle’ 
(probably Hash House Harriers from Kuching) and occasional donations by individual 
politicians, particularly in the pre-Taib era. However, the longest-serving and most prominent 
of these beneficent parties is the Anglican church, which began providing basic healthcare 
and education in the region in the late-nineteenth century, well before large-scale conversion 
took place. Many of my acquaintances credit Anglican missionaries with teaching Bidayuhs 
to stop fighting and taking heads, and to live in harmony and support each other during 
bereavement
vii
 and other difficult moments (see Chua 2012a:82-87). In the 1990s, the 
Anglican church was joined in the area by the SIB, which has also garnered a positive 
reputation for giving financial and other aid to its adherents.  
My acquaintances roundly describe these churches and their representatives as ‘kind’ and 
‘generous’—characteristics which they pointedly contrast with the Kirieng government, 
whom they charge with allowing only Muslims to ‘maju’. ‘All the kemudahan in this area 
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comes from outside,’ a young SIB mother once told me, ‘But those YBs [Members of 
Parliament] have given us nothing.’ She added that whereas government officials would tell 
villagers to fill out endless forms in order to obtain kemudahan, the Christian churches and 
many NGOs would simply hand over the cash. Their ability to do so is sometimes linked to 
the transnational communities of which they are part, and whose charity and compassion 
have brought donations, provisions, water tanks and even new buildings to rural areas. A 
blacksmith’s forge built in a neighbouring village by a Singaporean church group, for 
instance, was sometimes held up by my informants as an exemplar of how kemudahan could 
be acquired without recourse to the government’s bureaucratic, ethno-religiously biased 
channels.  
In sum, Christianity has acquired subtle political overtones over the years as both a legible 
means of being modern (but not Muslim) in Malaysia and a practical route of obtaining 
development while circumventing the state. Like adat gawai, however, its capacity to do so is 
ultimately circumscribed by state policies and responses. I was told, for example, that 
although the village mentioned earlier had persuaded its ‘Singapore friends’ to pay for a new 
road to replace the rocky path leading to it, the government would not permit them to 
undertake the project. Consequently, my acquaintances’ efforts to obtain development 
through their own religious resources are tempered by a sense of entrapment and frustration: 
of being tied to and reliant on a state which they are unwilling to trust. This is exacerbated by 
the widespread opinion that even when development comes, it does so at a price—in this case, 
the loss of their land and villages. In recent years, these sentiments have been aggravated by 
the widely-shared expectation that the cleared area will then be gazetted as a national park, a 
resort built near the reservoir, and the profits shared among the politicians. It is in these 
moments that Christianity’s limitations as a material and political resource become painfully 
evident. Yet, these are also the points at which it comes into its own as a theological and 
moral influence in Bidayuhs’ lives.  
 
Development through a Christian lens 
For most Bidayuhs, Christianity is not merely a political tool but also ‘a meaningful system in 
its own right, one capable of guiding many areas of their lives’ (Robbins 2004, p. 3). In this 
capacity, it has become interlaced with the affected villagers’ efforts to make sense of and 
respond to the changes caused by the dam-construction and resettlement project. Significantly, 
I found that Christian notions and ideals were most often invoked in the context of opposition 
to—or at least unease over—the scheme. Of these, three recurred with particular frequency: 
individual morality, communal responsibility and the renunciation of (excessive) wealth.  
As I explain elsewhere (Chua 2012b), a distinctive Christian addition to Bidayuh 
communities has been the notion of the individual self as the locus of moral agency—one 
involved in a direct relationship of love (rindu) with God. This individualist model, however, 
is tempered by a strong and equally Christian ethos of love for one’s neighbour: of taking 
care of the community at large and maintaining peace and good relations. As the scheme has 
progressed, these motifs have grown increasingly entwined with ideas of worldly 
renunciation, or at least non-covetousness, in the ruminations of those who are opposed to or 
uncertain about resettlement. Unlike supporters of the scheme, who tend to couch it in 
development-oriented terms of ‘progress’ and ‘modernization’, these people use Christianity 
to muddy the situation and the power relations imbued in it. And as the following example 
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reveals, prayer gatherings—which are the only occasions on which villagers regularly come 
together from their dispersed farming activities—have become sites at which the tensions 
between these different parties are played out.  
Shortly after construction commenced, a group of affected households began working with a 
human rights lawyer and opposition politician to contest the legality of the scheme and obtain 
official recognition of their right to build their own villages on their ancestral land rather than 
move to the resettlement site. The leader of this group is also the sole Anglican prayer leader 
of his village: a talented orator who has single-handedly run its prayer gatherings for years. 
As matters progressed, Sunday services and fellowship meetings in his village became 
microcosms and barometers of its internal fissures. Just after the case went to court, several 
families stopped attending Sunday services in apparent protest at the prayer leader’s 
behaviour, which they thought might jeopardise their access to government compensation. 
When I arrived a few months later, the strains had eased, partly because many pro-settlement 
villagers had moved out with their newfound wealth. This demographic shift altered the 
dynamics of church services again, turning them into less fractious arenas in which the prayer 
leader and his allies could discuss the situation.  
During my visit, I attended a fellowship gathering at which most attendees were involved in 
the anti-resettlement case. Following an hour of praise and worship, the prayer leader took 
advantage of the largely friendly crowd and began expounding on the legal proceedings. As 
he spoke, he deployed an intriguing melange of language and ideas deriving from official 
pembangunan discourses, Christianity, and legal and human rights terminology (picked up 
from the lawyers and sympathetic NGOs). Echoing the words of earlier missionaries (Chua 
2012a, p. 138), he exhorted his listeners not to be afraid: it was not wrong, he said, to fight 
for their land rights (hak tanah). What they needed now, he added, was for the government to 
acknowledge (ngaku) their ‘title’ (English) to the land on which they planned to build an 
alternative village. Other people could take the compensation money, he pointed out, but 
everyone in this room was going to do the right thing. In this way, he situated his audience 
within a moral framework that depicted them as forgoing immediate financial gain for the 
sake of a righteous outcome.  
The prayer leader’s portrayal of the situation would have been familiar to many in attendance, 
for the notion of following the way of the Lord (aran Tuhan/Tǎpa) rather than ‘this world’ 
(dunia ong) is a common theme in sermons throughout Bidayuh communities. In recent years, 
it seems to have gained especial currency among opponents of resettlement as a way of 
accounting for their fellow villagers’ co-optation into the scheme. During fieldwork, I 
occasionally heard morose remarks about how kin and neighbours had become greedy and 
waylaid by money rather than taking care of their land and community. Such actions were 
depicted as an abrogation of their responsibility to their fellow Christians and villagers and, 
by extension, their personal responsibility to God. Accordingly, such ruminations were 
sometimes accompanied by comments on the inner character of the people in question. When 
a village elder and staunch supporter of resettlement showed up at a Sunday service looking 
exceptionally surly, for example, the woman next to me whispered conspiratorially that 
perhaps his atin (heart, inner spirit) was troubled (susah) because of his recent behaviour, 
implying that coming to church and entering the presence of God had somehow pricked his 
conscience.  
These examples reveal how Christian ideas, practices and spaces have been implicated—
alongside notions of indigenous rights, pembangunan ideals and other factors—in the 
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affected villagers’ experiences of and responses to the resettlement scheme. Crucially, I 
suggest, they help to mitigate a poignant problem that no amount of grumbling about 
Malay/Melanau-Muslim hegemony will resolve: the fact that some of the thorniest conflicts 
over this scheme are not between Bidayuhs and political ‘others’, but within Bidayuh 
communities and families. On a larger scale, there is also the irrefutable but equally troubling 
fact that the chief engineers of state-led development projects in the area are not Malays or 
Melanaus, but Bidayuh politicians. Such figures are often criticised by affected villagers of 
all stripes for their ‘nakar’ (mischief-making) behaviour: for personally profiting from state 
politics and development spinoffs while their fellow Bidayuhs suffer the consequences. 
Without recourse to an anti-Malay/Muslim critique, some rural residents have depicted their 
behaviour in terms of a failure to live up to Christian ideals—for not caring about their own 
people while chasing money and political power. Over the last few years, I have occasionally 
heard pronouncements to the effect of, ‘He [Bidayuh politician] calls himself Christian, but 
look at what he’s doing to his own people.’ Similarly, a comment in English on a highly 
critical Sarawakian blog runs thus:   
Wonder what kind of Christians are these Bidayuh BN [Barisan Nasional, the ruling 
coalition] goons? Far from what Jesus teaching! 
Never inside the Bible that show Jesus hang around with corrupt leaders oppressing 
the poor (except being cruxified [sic] for helping the poor and against evil Roman 
rule). 
[…] 
Bidayuh folks must get their head right this time: stop voting the BN evil looters and 
be a responsible Christians. Help, defend the poor Bidayuhs like what Jesus always 
did, not kill them for BN greed.  
Whether or not the poster was from the affected area, his or her comments are an apt, if 
unusually eloquent, encapsulation of the sorts of sentiments I have heard in this area. Unlike 
the Lun Bawang and Kelabit whose responses to Malay-Muslim hegemony are framed by the 
‘Law of Love’ (Bala, this volume), my Bidayuh acquaintances’ ruminations tend to focus on 
fairness, justice and individual responsibility. In the process, they reconfigure their 
relationship to the government by holding their political representatives accountable to a 
different—and arguably greater—moral order than that of the state. Perhaps it was just this 
logic that lay behind some of my informants’ grim verdict, which I heard on a few occasions, 
that the cancer which later struck one of the politicians behind the scheme was a just 
punishment from God. 
  
Conclusion 
In recent decades, most scholarship on development and economic policy in Malaysia has 
focused on the politics of race and indigeneity on the Peninsula. If religion—usually in the 
form of Islam—is present in these accounts, it too is highly politicized and invariably tied to 
the ‘Malay-Muslim exceptionalism’ (Yeoh, this volume) that characterizes the postcolonial 
state. What this chapter has attempted to do, however, is shed light on not only the politics 
but also the religious dimensions of pembangunan elsewhere in Malaysia, from the 
perspective of one of its ethnic minority communities.  
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Contrary to the resolutely ‘anti-political’, a-religious tenor of official developmentalist 
discourses, pembangunan for my Bidayuh acquaintances is shot through with religious 
tensions, politics, concepts and moral templates. By this, I do not mean to portray adat gawai 
or Christianity as all-encompassing ‘cultures’ that invariably determine their responses to 
development interventions. Bidayuhs are every bit as likely to attribute the failures, problems 
and indeed promises of pembangunan to factors such as the global economy, environmental 
considerations and party politics. These elements, however, are woven into their lives 
alongside concerns about Muslim hegemony, Christian moral responsibility, and the agency 
of both God and the old gawai spirits. Rather like the strands of a Bidayuh rattan basket, such 
religious influences alternate between visibility and concealment, lending shape and structure 
to the situation without dominating it.  
In the same way that state-led development projects have become sites at which wider inter-
religious tensions and concerns are played out, then, both adat gawai and Christianity have 
become means through which my acquaintances grapple with the contingencies of 
development. What I have tried to underscore, however, is the distinctly quotidian quality of 
these ongoing negotiations. Such negotiations are responses, in part, to the demographic 
fluidity of the region and the acknowledged riskiness of outright religious discord (see also 
Yeoh, this volume). However, they also reflect the suffusive nature of the different religious 
influences in Bidayuhs’ lives. Just as my acquaintances find it impossible to disentangle 
Islam from contemporary Malaysian statehood and pembangunan, they see adat gawai and 
Christianity as intrinsic to, and not distinct from, their socio-economic and political existence 
(Chua 2012a). Consequently, I argue, they enable Bidayuhs to ambiguate rather than 
outwardly contest their economic, political and religious marginality through various small-
scale means: by turning ‘cultural’ preservation into a moral duty for the state, by tapping into 
charitable transnational religious networks, and by morally reframing the actions of peers and 
political representatives through Christian tenets. Viewed in this light, religious ‘toleration’ 
and ‘conflict’ look less like dichotomous states than like intertwined strands in a tangled and 
ever-shifting relational bundle. And it is only by studying them from the ground up, through 
the prism of the everyday, that scholarly observers can do justice to their multiplicity and 
complexity. 
                                                          
Notes 
i
 This was one of a series of such events at which the affected villagers were awarded 
compensation cheques for the land they were about to lose.  
ii
 Sarawak and Sabah gained independence from Britain in 1963 when they joined Malaya 
and Singapore to form the Federation of Malaysia.  
iii
 In 2010, protests and violence erupted in parts of Malaysia, including Sarawak, when the 
High Court ruled in favour of allowing non-Muslims to use the term ‘Allah’ to refer to God.  
iv
 Owing to the controversial nature of the scheme, I refrain from describing or referencing it 
in detail here. 
v
 Indeed, they are often grouped together as a single constituency (see, e.g., Jayum and King 
1994). 
vi
 I cite these Malay words as they have been incorporated into everyday speech, rather than 
modifying them for grammatical consistency. 
vii
 One of the most commonly cited reasons for converting to Christianity was the fact that the 
old death rituals were extremely elaborate and expensive, with the bereaved family having to 
pay large fees (rice, jars, cash, etc.) to a ritual specialist and undertaker to dispose of the 
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corpse. Conversion to Christianity was seen to ‘free’ people from such expenses and 
encourage mutual cooperation during the mourning period.  
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